Podcast: Will Israel's war spread north? The view from Lebanon with Kim Ghattas

Transcript

Listen: How likely is it that the Israel-Hamas war spreads into a wider conflict in the Middle East? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with Beirut-based journalist and analyst Kim Ghattas for the on-the-ground perspective from across Israel’s northern border with Lebanon.

Clashes between Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group, have been increasing on the border since the October 7th Hamas attacks, and tensions in the region are extremely high. There’s a lot of anxiety in Lebanon right now about the potential for an Israeli strike, Ghattas explains, because of its history of Israeli invasion and the strength of Hezbollah, which has some 150,000 rockets and heavy duty weapons. Given that Lebanon is a country already reeling from economic collapse, a refugee crisis from Syria, a deadly 2020 explosion in the port of Beirut, and a massive currency devaluation, the consequences of war spreading across the Israeli border would be devastating for the country. Can diplomacy help lower tensions in the Middle East before simmering tensions boil over?

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TRANSCRIPT: The view from Lebanon with Kim Ghattas

Kim Ghattas:

There's a lot of anxiety about what this might mean for Lebanon, and of course there's a lot of horror. And so the people are torn between wanting to express their devastation about Gaza, express their support for Palestinian civilians and saying at the same time, "We want no part of this."

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today we are returning to the Middle East and the ongoing Israel-Hamas War to examine what could trigger a wider regional conflict. Gaza is once again consumed in violence after the brief ceasefire collapsed. Tensions throughout the Middle East are, to put it mildly, extremely high, and there's a complex balancing act between religious interests, Iranian proxy groups, and Arab powers that needs to happen to keep them from spiraling out of control. Could recent clashes with Hezbollah on Israel's northern border with Lebanon and Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea be the sparks of a much bigger war? To help answer that question and many more, my guest today is Kim Ghattas as a Lebanese journalist who has spent years reporting on the Middle East and international affairs. Let's get to it.

Speaker 3:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, Prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics real estate, and the only end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more at prologis.com. This podcast is also brought to you by Bleecker Street and LD Entertainment presenting I.S.S.: When war breaks out on earth between the U.S. and Russia, astronauts aboard the International Space Station fight each other for control. This sci-Fi thriller is only in theaters January 19th.

Ian Bremmer:

Kim Ghattas, thanks so much for joining us again on GZERO World.

Kim Ghattas:

Thanks for having me, Ian. Great to be with you.

Ian Bremmer:

Let me start with the most basic, which is you're there in Beirut. Talk to me about how people are relating to this conflict to the war. Is it dominating every conversation and what are they saying? How are people thinking about it?

Kim Ghattas:

Ian, it's absolutely dominating everything because of course, while the war is ongoing in Gaza between Hamas and Israel, there are also skirmishes clashes between Israel and Hezbollah--the Lebanese Shia militant group, which operates not only in southern Lebanon but also across the region from Syria to Iraq and to some extent in Yemen. And those clashes started in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attack of October 7th and have continued to this day. And so people are focused on the horrific images coming out of Israel first and then Gaza, but also very worried about what this might mean for Lebanon. We know now that the US has dissuaded the Israelis from a preemptive strike against Lebanon in the first few days and weeks after October 7th, but the concern is that a strike might still come. And although Hezbollah and therefore Iran, its main patron equal partner almost, I think these days these two Iran and Hezbollah are almost equal partners I think.

Although they've shown a lot of pragmatism and restraint, and we can go into that, when it comes to how Hezbollah operates on the border, there are concerns that in the long term Israel will not be able to continue to live with Hezbollah on its border. So there's a sense that an Israeli strike against Lebanon is probably bound to happen at some point unless the diplomacy can find a way out of that. So there's a lot of anxiety about what this might mean for Lebanon, and of course there's a lot of horror at what is unfolding in Gaza. And so the people are torn between wanting to express their devastation about Gaza, express their support for Palestinian civilians and saying at the same time, "We want no part of this. We've paid our dues when it comes to the Palestinian cause. We had our own civil war." And there's a movement in Lebanon called Lebanon Against War to try to amplify this chorus of voices, which people hope will also be heard by Hezbollah and by the Israelis.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, Lebanon is of course a very diverse population. It's hardly just a group of people that support Hezbollah. It's a very large Christian population in addition. Is there a sensibility inside Lebanon that the focus should be on Hamas and the horrors of what they did on October 7th? Is there any among the Lebanese population support for alignment with what the Israeli government has been going through and has to respond to or not at all?

Kim Ghattas:

It's very hard when you are on this side of the border and you have lived through Israeli invasions and Israeli bombardment of this country to be able to continue to focus only on what happened on the 7th of October and not be entirely consumed by what is unfolded in Gaza. Ian, in 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon after an attempted assassination of an Israeli ambassador in London. And that invasion lasted over two months with a siege of Beirut where the capital city was cut off of water, fuel, food, and 17,000 people died. We forget, but that was a devastating moment for Lebanon at the time. 30,000 people were injured, and Beirut was besieged for two and a half months until the Palestinian militants, the Organization of Liberation of Palestine headed by Yasser Arafat and his armed group, Fatah, who were using Lebanon to stage attacks against Israel were then forced out of the country. So I think that-

Ian Bremmer:

And it led to Hezbollah.

Kim Ghattas:

In many ways, indeed it led to Hezbollah, and that's something that the Israelis need to think about today as they pound Gaza and say they want to eradicate Hamas. Well, back in 1982, they wanted to eradicate the PLO, and then in 2006, when they also got into a war between Hezbollah with Hezbollah, because Hezbollah had kidnapped Israeli soldiers on the border, they said they wanted to eradicate Hezbollah. And yet here we are, Hezbollah is still incredibly strong, even stronger than in 2006. So I think that while people were really shocked by what they saw on October 7th, and I think a lot of people around the world were not given enough time to absorb what this meant, what the horror of it really encapsulated and what a national trauma it was for Israel because the focus shifted quickly to Gaza and that's what's consuming everybody today.

You have to remember that the Palestinian cause still has real connection to a lot of people in this region. People connect with it. It just felt like a great injustice that has lasted 75 years, and it's time to address it and it's time to address it without war. That's where people feel like there is a repetition of violence on both sides because yes, what Hamas did was horrendous and just beyond description really. But I think the focus today in Lebanon is a sympathy for civilians who are dying every day now in Gaza and fear of what might happen in Lebanon or to Lebanon.

Ian Bremmer:

I want to just push a little harder on--so if you're Israel and you can't be expected to live next to a region that is controlled by Hamas, certainly not after October 7th, no one would expect that. But the goals has been stated by the war cabinet as we have to destroy Hamas. What does that mean? When can this war end? When is it possible for the Israelis to say, "Okay, enough." And what do they do next? Do you have any idea from your perspective, from the perspective of what you're seeing in Lebanon, how might that happen?

Kim Ghattas:

I've been speaking to Arab officials and American officials over the last few days who feel that this is going towards a lose-lose situation where there is no way for Israel to say that it has achieved its goal of eradicating Hamas and feels it cannot continue endlessly with the war because the casualty numbers on the Israeli side are mounting as well in the Israeli army. You have 17,000 or plus Palestinians who are killed, including I think that number now is accepted by most people including the Israelis. Of course, amongst those numbers are several thousand Hamas combatant as well, most probably. But you also have a lot of people who have not been accounted for who are still under the rubble. And so the fear is that you end up with devastation in Gaza, thousands of civilians dead and Hamas still operating or not completely put out of action, and the Israeli hostages still somewhere in Gaza. And I think that's a terrible thing to consider.

We know that there is not much sympathy for Hamas amongst many Arab governments, but at some point, and we saw that in 2006, it's possible that the Israelis will turn to the US and say, "This is as much as we can achieve, and we might be ready for a more longer term humanitarian pause, et cetera." They'll decrease the intensity of the military action, but will continue with punctual kinetic action inside Gaza. Because what happened in 2006 when Hezbollah and Israel went to war is that Israel had told the United States, "We want to finish the job. We want to eradicate Hezbollah." But after several weeks they realized that wasn't going to happen, and so they turned to the Americans and said, "Okay, we need you to ask for a ceasefire now." And so there's a concern that this is what we're going to see now again, except that it's going to have, as the UN Secretary General himself said, it'll have had catastrophic consequences not only for Palestinians but also for the region at large. And as Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned, Israel may be facing a strategic defeat.

Ian Bremmer:

And Netanyahu--of course, the Prime Minister--also facing not just ouster when the war is over, but quite possibly jail time. So personally, it's harder for him to get in that direction too. But let's turn to Lebanon. You've said that it might be hard for Israel to also live with Hezbollah there. Not that they necessarily have good military options for removing them, but like Hamas, Hezbollah has an eradicationist ideology. What does that mean for Israel Lebanon going forward? How do you think it is going to play out?

Kim Ghattas:

So what I've found very interesting, and I've written about that in the Atlantic and the Financial Times, is that Hezbollah's approach and reaction to October 7th and Iran's reaction has been one of rather interesting restraint and pragmatism. I know that right now what we're seeing is increased attacks against US troops in Iraq and in Syria, and that is of great concern. But the expectation initially was that there would be an instant conflagration on the Lebanon-Israel border, and that has not happened. In addition, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, interestingly enough, waited four weeks before he spoke out--four weeks after October 7th. And yes, I know that we've had some inflammatory, the usual statements by Iranian officials and especially the Foreign Minister, but Hezbollah's attitude and their relative restraint on the border has been interesting to observe. And the way I explain that is we have to remember that Iran has for 44 years now, claimed that it is a supporter of the Palestinian people and that it's proxies, including Hezbollah, are there to help the Palestinians "liberate Jerusalem."

So the expectation was that in the wake of the October 7th attack by Hamas, there would be a assistance by groups like Hezbollah to sort of push forward with Hamas's agenda and help Hamas further. What we've seen instead is Hamas complaining that Hezbollah is not helping them enough, is not backing them up enough, and that's because I think Iran has come to realize that its use of the Palestinian cause or the Palestinian card has in essence bumped up against the limits of what is possible. Hezbollah today serves one purpose for Iran. It is to operate as a key line of defense. Lebanon is seen by Iran as a forward defense space. Iran is not going to use Hezbollah to defend the Palestinians or to assist Hamas. It's going to keep that card for the event that Iran needs protection from a strike either by Israel or the United States. And that's why the deterrence works on both sides actually, because Israel also knows that Hezbollah's capabilities have increased dramatically since 2006.

So today, in a way, I don't want to say the game is up for Hezbollah, but they've shown by their relative restraint. And I know that there is a low intensity war on the border between Lebanon and Israel, but they've shown with their relative restraint that their role today is to mostly be there for Iran. So the idea amongst American officials, and I presume Israelis and Arabs, is to see how we can reduce the tension on the border between Israel and Lebanon through diplomatic negotiations that would include the full application of UN Resolution 1701, which stipulates several things, including that Israel should no longer target Lebanon, but also that Hezbollah should not be positioned along the border. While Hezbollah will never openly declare that it's withdrawn from that area, there are ways in which everybody can agree that diplomatically it has been resolved and Israelis can return to Northern Israel and the Lebanese can return to Southern Lebanon because villages there are empty as well.

Ian Bremmer:

And Hezbollah, it needs to be said, is militarily far more capable than Hamas ever has been. So I mean, if there were open warfare here, the Israelis certainly know that it's going to be much, much more costly for them than the attacks that they've made on the Palestinians.

Kim Ghattas:

Yes, that's why I said the deterrence works both ways because Hezbollah has 150,000 missiles. They are hardened fighters who have a lot of experience now fighting in Syria, in Iraq, assisting certainly Iraq and in Yemen, but fighting in Syria. So they are much more experienced in this kind of warfare than Israelis to some extent because they've not had this kind of on the ground experience. The Israeli army has not had this kind of on the ground experience for a while now, whereas Hezbollah has, and it has 150,000 missiles, including many several thousand precision guided missiles. So it will be devastating on both sides, and I think the urgency is to try to find a diplomatic exit, a diplomatic outcome for this question. And very interestingly, Ian, because you asked me what the position was in Lebanon, I was intrigued by an interview the Lebanese prime minister, caretaker, Lebanese prime minister, gave to The Economist in October where he put forward a peace plan, which is unusual for a Lebanese prime minister.

That was usually the role of Syria when it had a role. It's no longer a player, it's a pawn now, and that is something that has changed in the general equation of how you should look at peacemaking in the Middle East, but we can discuss that if you want. But the Lebanese Prime Minister put forward a peace plan, which went through the first few phases that everybody's discussing: ceasefire, pauses, reconstruction of Gaza, liberate the hostages, and then interestingly enough, two-state solution. And if there is a two-state solution, he seems to think Hezbollah and Hamas would give up their weapons but he made clear to say that Iran had to be at the table for any comprehensive solution. I'm fairly certain that this is not just his idea and that there are others in the region, possibly Iran, possibly Qatar, who have put this idea forward to him, to present to the world.

And so I think it would be very interesting to see where is Iran on the idea of a two-state solution today. I heard that from others as well in Lebanon from Iranians, just the idea that anyone would discuss two-state solution would have been impossible to imagine in those camps even a few years ago. But the realization of what 7th of October has done and what it could signify going forward, I think has focused people's minds, and I wonder whether there are compromises that people might be willing to make to make sure this does not devolve into a regional widespread escalation.

Ian Bremmer:

I mean, clearly the United States, which is in a pretty isolated position right now, wants to be able to pivot towards that kind of peacemaking and would welcome countries in the region playing a role on all sides, playing a role to force that prioritization after ignoring it for such a long time. I wonder the other side of that, I'm thinking specifically even if the border with Lebanon is seen to be relatively stable right now, the attacks of the Houthis--the radical Shia who are proxies of Iran based in Yemen--on shipping, on Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea and elsewhere. They've said that they're declaring war on all Israeli vessels that they see, and the Israelis have said that they'll hit back. Clearly, I mean, that is not an area that looks stable. That's an area that's been escalating in this conflict over the past weeks. And if the Israelis end up engaging in strikes against Iran, well then all bets with Hezbollah are off. So talk a little bit about that part of the equation.

Kim Ghattas:

I do want to clarify that I don't mean to say that Iran will be at the table with the US and Israel. I don't see that happening. Iran can be at the table via proxy. They have a channel today with the Saudis, which they have been using to signal that they don't want this to escalate. The problem with the Iranians is that they might feel in a tight spot. I think they were incredibly worried that this war was going to reach them very quickly, especially because the US sent warships to the region and Israel was clearly not in a mood for restraint--understandably after what happened after October 7th. And so they sent out these signals that they did not want an escalation, but the issue with the Iranians is that they are experts at turning moments of jeopardy into moments of opportunity.

And the long for them of course, and the longer that this conflict goes on, the more they have an opportunity to breathe, to adapt, to recalculate and recalibrate. Part of what we're seeing in terms of an escalation with the Houthis, but also in Iraq, is part of that. They're pushing back. I think it's still within limits of certain rules of engagement, if you will, that all sides understand, but a mass casualty event on either side and you can suddenly find yourself in a massive escalation that nobody can control anymore. I think the more likely scenario is a horizontal spreading quagmire where we have more of this for many, many months from Gaza with a potential insurgency setting in, with continued battles on the Lebanon-Israel border. Just more of this, but for months, which makes diplomacy almost more difficult, if you will.

Ian Bremmer:

So final question to you, because I mean, again, these countries are very good at ultimately trying to understand what their long-term interests are, and we see that with Iran, we see that with the Gulf states as well. I'm wondering if through all of this, do we think that pragmatism prevails? And what I'm specifically thinking is the long-term views of Israel in the region. We were heading towards normalization with the Saudis. We had the Abraham Accords with the Emiratis, with Bahrain, with other countries in the region. On the back of the war that we've seen over the past couple months, has there been a sea change in the perception of Israel in the region or not really? And at the end of the day, we're still kind of in this environment where countries are going to do what they need to do to look after themselves.

Kim Ghattas:

I think there's a narrow window during which things can change. I don't think we're there yet, but I think we're reaching that point where it's going to become harder to even utter the word peace. But I think the Saudis would still like to push forward with normalization, except that the Palestinian component of that is going to have to be much bigger. If they were willing to go ahead with normalization, with a small concession to the Palestinians, as long as they got whatever they wanted from the Americans, that is no longer an option. The Abraham Accords I don't think are in any danger, but it's a bit cool at the moment. And I sensed in many Gulf countries a somber mood setting in because in the first few weeks after October 7th, there was perhaps a sense that this would last as past conflicts have lasted: four weeks, five weeks, not more.

But now we're talking, the Israelis are talking about months, possibly a year. Other dynamics then start to set in. But the other thing that I found very interesting and very pragmatic coming from a Saudi thinker that I was speaking to just a few days ago, he seemed very... As a matter of fact, about what was happening in Gaza. I mean, there is outrage, there is fear, there is a deep sympathy for civilians dying. There is understanding of the horror of what happened in Israel. But you know what he said to me? He said, "Nobody's hands are clean. Look at what Iran did in Syria. You have half a million people dead there." So there's a pragmatism about what will need to be done once the war is over, if it ends in a way where it's still possible to bring people to the table, but everybody's going to have to make concessions. And that includes the Israelis.

I'm just not sure that the public is ready for it, that the leaders are ready for it. Benjamin Netanyahu doesn't seem to be ready to speak in that way. Of course, American officials are hoping he'll be gone, there'll be an election. We're just not sure how this is going to unfold. So again, I think there's a lot of pragmatism alongside the devastation and the feelings of sympathy and horror at the continued deaths of civilians in a sense that there is still an opportunity to turn tragedy into something more positive, but the mood can change.

If this sort of somberness sets in for several months, it becomes harder to bring back people from the extreme positions that they've staked out and bring them back to a middle ground and really focus heads on the idea that, for Israel's own security--this is the argument that American officials are making to Israel, and I'm sure Arab officials are making as well--in Israel's own interest, it needs to address the issue of a Palestinian state and accept that that is going to be a serious discussion that needs to be had. It has to be on the table as a serious effort.

Ian Bremmer:

Kim Ghattas, thanks so much for joining us.

Kim Ghattas:

Thanks for having me.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you did. Well, why don't you check us out at gzeromedia.com and take a moment to sign up for our newsletter. It's called GZERO Daily.

Speaker 3:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, Prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics, real estate, and the only end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more at prologis.com. This podcast is also brought to you by Bleecker Street and LD Entertainment presenting I.S.S.: When war breaks out on earth between the US and Russia, astronauts aboard the International Space Station fight each other for control. This sci-Fi thriller is only in theaters January 19th. GZERO World would also like to share a message from our friends at Foreign Policy. Global Reboot, a podcast from Foreign Policy Magazine, was created as countries economies emerged from the pandemic and called for a reboot. On each episode, host and Foreign Policy editor-in-Chief Ravi Agrawal asked some of the smartest thinkers and doers around to push for solutions to the world's greatest problems. From resetting the US-China relationship to dealing with the rise of AI and preserving our oceans, find Global Reboot in partnership with the Doha Forum wherever you get your podcasts.