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Taiwan honour guards march in front of a statue of Chinese Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at a changing of the guards ceremony on October 27, 2003. Chiang's widow, Soong May-ling, died aged 106 in New York last week. Family members are considering whether to bury the former first lady in the United States, Taiwan or China.
Why Taiwan struggles to move past Chiang Kai-shek’s legacy
Taiwan’s government has pledged accelerate efforts to remove over 700 statues of Chiang Kai-shek, the former leader responsible for Taiwan’s independence and decades of authoritarian rule.
Odd as it may sound to play down the country’s founding figure, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party sees removing the statues as a way to move symbolically beyond its painful past. The opposition Kuomintang or KMT – Chiang’s old party – is fighting to keep his image in places of prominence, particularly military institutions, and it’s not an idle debate: Chiang’s memory ties Taiwan’s political discourse to the mainland, and how the government treats his memorials resonates in Beijing.
The young warlord. Chiang rose to prominence in the chaos that followed the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. The KMT formed a provisional government but was quickly forced to hand power to Gen. Yuan Shikai, who soon died.
Powerful men carved out fiefdoms for themselves, while what remained of the KMT reorganized itself in the far southern city of Guangdong under its leader Sun Yat-sen. Chiang, who had served in the Imperial Japanese Army, took command of the KMT’s military academy in Whampoa in 1924. He and Sun saw military strength as the only avenue to reunite China and build a modern nation.
Backed by Soviet military advisors and bolstered in number by an alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, KMT forces trained for two years to strike northward. On the eve of war, however, Sun died. Chiang seized control and launched a bloody invasion of central and eastern China in July of 1926. By April of 1927, Chiang's forces had taken Shanghai, with approximately 700,000 people dead.
Rivalry with the Communists. With Shanghai secured, Chiang turned on his erstwhile allies and killed thousands of communists and suspected sympathizers.
Though the KMT would go on to take Beijing and nominally unify China in 1928, this so-called “Shanghai massacre” had effectively launched the country into another civil war. A young Mao Zedongretreated into the mountains of Jiangxi province to launch guerrilla attacks against the KMT, and the Northern Expedition did little to end warlordism.
Japanese ambitions. Across the Yellow Sea, Tokyo eyed Chiang’s unification efforts with unease. Japan had preyed upon China’s weakness to wrest away control of Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1905, and it controlled significant economic interests in the northern region of Manchuria. Just as the KMT began to find serious success in 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria.
Chiang offered little resistance and focused instead on purging the communists. By 1934, he had eliminated some 90% of their fighting strength, but Mao fled to the northwest on his Long March, where he re-established a base of operations in October 1935.
By then, Chiang’s subordinates had had enough. They launched a conspiracy to kidnap him in the city of Xi’an in late 1936 and forced him to agree to an anti-Japanese alliance with Mao. Months later, Japanese forces launched a full invasion of China.
Saved by Uncle Sam. Tokyo rapidly secured key coastal cities and pushed Chiang west into the mountains. President Franklin Roosevelt was alarmed but constrained by a US public that wanted no part in an overseas war, so he could only offer economic and political support to Chiang.
Part of that support included an oil embargo against Japan, which contributed to Tokyo’s ill-fated decision to launch surprise attacks against Pearl Harbor, Manila, and Hong Kong on Dec. 7, 1941. The US began sending Chiang billions of dollars of aid, and troops to fight in Burma in a costly effort to keep supply lines open. Chiang allegedly stole staggering quantities of this aid, leading US Gen. Joseph Stilwell to give him the nickname “Cash My Check.”
Downfall and flight. While KMT and allied troops were fighting a bloody but largely ineffective campaign against Japan, Mao and his communists were gathering strength for the wars to come. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the US dispatched Gen. George Marshall to build a unity government between Mao and Chiang, but the two sides were in open warfare by 1947.
President Harry Truman was not ready to support the unpopular and corrupt Chiang, and the KMT’s forces quickly melted. On Dec. 7, 1949, Chiang evacuated his government to Taiwan, where he intended to regroup and launch a reconquest of the mainland.
A new identity? In Taiwan, Chiang imposed martial law and began a strategy of economic development to build a capable military-industrial base. He was joined by around two million nationalist troops, and around a million civilians fled the mainland between 1949 and 1955.
These new arrivals known as waishengren coalesced into a distinct — and privileged — Mandarin-speaking social class. They formed the core of Chiang’s government and economic reform strategy, in contrast to the majority Minnan- and Hakka-speaking indigenous population of Taiwan, who had few ties across the strait and suffered more under military rule.
But Chiang never came close to reconquering China, and as the country moved toward democratization following his death in 1975, intense debate has centered on Taiwan’s relationship to the mainland. Those with ties to Chiang’s government in the KMT see Taiwan as indelibly linked to China, even if they’ll never take back the mainland. Beijing sees the KMT as more sympathetic and pliable toward peaceful reunification because of that affinity.
Members of the ruling DPP party, including president-elect William Lai, on the other hand, sometimes question whether Taiwan would be better off essentially declaring itself not China, and downplaying links with Chinese nationalist figures like Chiang. Beijing doesn’t see a way to negotiate a peaceful integration with leaders who don’t share Chiang’s view of a China that includes Taiwan as an integral part, which is why the symbolism of removing statues of Chiang will have real-world consequences.
Xi Jinping shaping China's chilling future
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here. A Quick Take to kick off your week. All sorts of things going on, but I want to focus on China because that is the most world-changing of the issues that are on our plate right now. Xi Jinping, breaking through term limits, securing for himself, not surprisingly, a third term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. He is today, without question, the most powerful human being on the planet. And that should concern us in the sense that the system is incredibly opaque.
There are increasingly not effective checks and balances on his authority. It is also not aligned with the future that so many in the world are hoping for when it comes to the way that political and economic systems should function - rule of law, transparency, human rights. And I'm not suggesting that the United States has always been a shining example of all of those things, but certainly, you don't have the level of concentration of power in the US or any democracy that you presently have in authoritarian regimes, and particularly right now in China.
Now, there are a few things that are concerning about this development. One is that over time there had been a hope that China was going to economically reform to a greater extent and integrate itself more in the global economy. That is now becoming harder, in part because the Chinese are focusing much more domestically given their own economic challenges. Things like, for example, their dual circulation policy, given the demographic challenges, given the challenges and indebtedness, it is much more focused on Chinese supply chain. It is much more focused on Chinese consumption. But also the fact that you just aren't getting the same level of data out of China that you used to.
There's not publishing that data anymore, so it's fine. China has incredible amounts of data on their own population. The surveillance economy they have, which helps to drive Chinese political stability, but they're not willing to publish information on the second-largest economy of the world to the rest of the world. And of course, that creates a big black box for the rest of the world to invest. It creates more uncertainty, and over time, it potentially creates more uncoupling, the opposite of the globalization that endured so much human development and wealth over the course of the last 40, 50 years.
There's also the fact that Xi Jinping historically and the Chinese Communist Party for the last 50 years has been much more meritocratic than many other political systems. So yes, it's opaque, and yes, it doesn't have rule of law, and yes, it's not a democracy, but positions of authority. If you want to make it through the Communist Party, you have to be, of course, orthodox and loyal, but you also have to be really, really capable. And the smartest, most capable authorities were the ones that would make it through the top ranks.
That is absolutely not what we saw from the leadership that has just been unveiled around Xi Jinping, where a lot of very capable senior bureaucrats in the Communist Party were sidelined. And instead, it was much more about personal loyalty to Xi. In other words, China increasingly moving away from the top-level human capital that helped get them to where they are today and instead moving in a more Putinesque direction. Not a good thing for the future of China, not a good thing for the future of the planet.
So I do think that what we're seeing coming out of China over the last week are, generally speaking, a little chilling, a little concerning for the future of the planet. I haven't yet mentioned, of course, the most titillating moment of the Party Congress, which was when former President Hu Jintao, sitting right next to Xi Jinping as the closing ceremonies were getting started, was suddenly escorted out by Xi Jinping's personal security. And the Chinese state media said it's because he wasn't feeling well.
For a guy that wasn't feeling well, number one, he really didn't want to go. Number two, Xi Jinping didn't say boo to him on his way out, didn't try to calm the situation or act in a more human and engaged way with someone who was having a health problem, not what you would do if it was purely about health. And then the fact that all discussion of Hu Jintao shut down on Chinese social media, none of that coverage was available to the Chinese population. Those are all things that implied there's something else going on here.
We don't know what that something else is. Was it possible that Hu Jintao was planning on making some kind of an oppositional statement or vote against Xi in terms of securing his third term? We don't know. Is it possible that there was an effort to sideline him internally because of things he had said inside the Party Congress over the course of the past week? We have no idea.
What we know is doing this publicly is an incredible symbolic power move by the most powerful person on the planet. That if that can happen to him, it could happen to anyone, any person in that room, and they are all aware of it. That's pretty extraordinary to see play out on the global stage. And I think that Xi Jinping has no problem with the United States of America and American allies seeing and taking away exactly those messages.
Of course, none of this can be discussed inside China because inside Chinese state media, you have to go with whatever the official narrative happens to be until they change it, in which point, yes, you've always been at war with Oceania. Yes, that's a 1984 reference, increasingly relevant when we talk about the Chinese Communist Party.
That's it for me. Hope everyone's well. I'll talk to you all real soon.
For more of Ian Bremmer's weekly analyses, subscribe to his GZERO World newsletter at ianbremmer.bulletin.com- What makes Xi Jinping tick? - GZERO Media ›
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Image of Xi Jinping in the background of a performance during the 100th anniversary of China's Communist Party in Beijing.
What makes Xi Jinping tick?
Later this week, Xi Jinping will get a precedent-shattering third term as secretary-general of China's ruling Communist Party. He's the most influential CCP leader since Deng Xiaoping and has elevated himself to the same stature as Mao Zedong. Xi now has virtually unfettered power in the world's most populous country and second-largest economy.
Yet, we know surprisingly little about him. China’s leader is not on social media, gives few interviews, and his bland public statements and carefully curated official biography offer few clues about what’s on his mind. Although Chinese kids study Xi Jinping Thought, he remains a black box for anyone outside of the CCP elite and those who know him personally.
So, what makes Xi tick? "He's motivated by power, by his understanding of Chinese history, by his sense of entitlement and privilege, and by China's future," says Sue-Lin Wong, former China correspondent for the The Economist and host of the podcast "The Prince" about all things Xi.
Xi's background is more complex than you'd think. On the one hand, he's the son of Xi Zhongxun, a revolutionary who fought alongside Mao in the Civil War and later became his chief propagandist and vice premier. Like most of China's current leadership, Xi is CCP royalty and benefited from his dad's street cred in rising to the top of the party.
On the other hand, the elder Xi was also one of many CCP senior officials who were purged by the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when his entire family was exiled to the countryside and had to live in a cave. But instead of blaming the party for his hardship, as some of his peers did, Xi’s takeaway was that such chaos must never, ever happen again.
"He believes that the party lost control” during that time, says Wong. “And so as long as the party stays in control, everything will be fine.”
That explains why Xi was equally traumatized by the end of the Soviet Union. He will do anything to stop the CCP from crumbling like the USSR — which to this day haunts the Chinese Communists.
Still, Xi the control freak faces tough internal and external challenges as he cements his power amid turbulent times for China. Zero-COVID is doing such a number on the economy that China is sitting on its latest GDP growth numbers, and the property market is performing so poorly that Xi didn't mention it in his keynote speech on Sunday.
Meanwhile, Russia's war in Ukraine — started by his BFF Vladimir Putin — is making the geopolitical environment more uncertain than Xi is comfortable with. But even if Putin gets humiliated in Ukraine, don’t expect Xi to side with the West.
After all, Xi sees the US as the top obstacle to realizing his ambitions: America will do whatever it take to keep China down. In this sense Xi particularly resents US support for Taiwan, which the West views as a democracy heroically standing up to authoritarian China but Beijing regards as its 23rd province.
Xi's ambition and drive cannot be understated in his quest to make China strong, with him calling all the shots. "I don't think there are many world leaders who lived in a cave for seven years as a teenager and have risen through the ranks of the CCP, which is this incredibly brutal, angry political machine," Wong says.
Unlike his predecessors, who accepted term limits, Xi sees his one-man rule as the best solution for China. No wonder the party intends to officially give him the symbolic title of "Great Helmsman" like Mao, which carries great weight in CCP political culture.
For Wong, Xi thinks “he is the man to be steering that ship and to be navigating China through these stormy waters” of COVID, a slowing Chinese economy, the war in Ukraine, and growing tensions with the West.
But his determination to be all-powerful might hurt Xi in the long run. If he continues surrounding himself with yes-men over experts, few will want to give him bad news and he might start making the wrong choices. And refusing to appoint a successor is a huge gamble if he encounters a health problem.
“That could have terrible implications,” Wong warns, “not just for the whole of China, but for the rest of the world."
This article comes to you from the Signal newsletter team of GZERO Media. Sign up today.
President Richard Nixon Shaking Hands with Chairman Mao Tse-tung in Zhongnanhai, Beijing.
Quiz: Nixon goes to China
February 21 is the 50th anniversary of Richard Nixon's historic visit to China, which began the normalization of US relations with the world's most populous Communist state — instantly shifting the Cold War balance of power. This bold move by a US president who had made his political reputation as an anti-Communist crusader shocked many at the time, but it helped set the stage for deeper ties between what are now the world's two most powerful nations and largest economies.
How well do you know the details of Nixon's week-long trip? Take our quiz to find out.
1. How did Nixon refer to National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger during his meeting with Mao?
A. A foreign policy genius
B. A ladies' man
C. A doctor of brains
2. The leader of which Asian country brokered Kissinger's secret 1971 visit to China that paved the way for Nixon's trip?
A. Yahya Khan, Pakistan
B. Indira Gandhi, India
C. Suharto, Indonesia
3. What did Nixon say while touring the Great Wall?
A. How long is it?
B. This is a great wall.
C. Who built it?
Answers
1. C — According to the now-declassified transcript of their conversation, when Mao asked Nixon about Kissinger's PhD, the US president responded that his National Security adviser was a "doctor of brains." Mao was however also very interested in Kissinger's playboy reputation, which Nixon acknowledged and joked about.
2. A — Soon after taking office in early 1969, the Nixon administration put out feelers to China through Pakistan, whose dictator personally delivered a message for China’s PM Zhou Enlai to relay to Mao. Mao agreed to start a dialogue — under the condition that the US withdraw all its forces from Taiwan. When Zhou finally met Kissinger in Beijing, the Chinese kept their promise to the US of total secrecy.
3. B — On the fourth day of his visit, Nixon took a road trip outside Beijing to check out China's most famous monument. After admiring the centuries-old structure, he famously quipped to the American media: "I think that you would have to conclude that this is a great wall." (The original quote is much longer.)
PLA soldiers are seen before a giant screen as Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the military parade marking the 70th founding anniversary of People's Republic of China, on its National Day in Beijing, China October 1, 2019.
Xi Jinping goes full 1984
"Who controls the past, controls the future; who controls the present, controls the past."
That slogan laid out the Party's sinister ploy to entrench itself in power by rewriting history in George Orwell's classic novel 1984. And it's what the ruling Communist Party now wants to do in China, where "Big Brother" Xi Jinping already oversees an authoritarian techno-surveillance state that in many ways exceeds the intrusion of Orwell's dystopian future.
The CCP's inner sanctum is in Beijing this week to hold its annual closed-door meeting. But this time it's done something rare by announcing one item on the agenda: an official resolution to revise China's historical narrative under its reign, to reflect Xi's take on the "correct" interpretation of party history — and by extension China's.
What the party comes up with won't just be an anodyne internal document only CCP nerds will obsess over. Xi's historical revision will influenceeverything in China — from foreign policy, to what's taught in schools or shown on TV and in films, to what constitutes the ultimate crime of disloyalty to the party — for an entire generation, if not longer.
From Mao, to Deng, to Xi. We've known for some time that Xi is the most influential Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, and arguably since Mao Zedong. Prior to Xi, only they have been able to rewrite the party's narrative arc on their own terms throughout the CCP's 100-year history.
Mao did it in 1945 to become the party's undisputed leader, then won the civil war and called all the shots for three decades. Deng did it in 1981 to call out Mao's excesses in the Great Leap Foward and Cultural Revolution, and to justify risky reforms that later turned China into an economic juggernaut.
Very soon Xi will forever be at their level. By drawing a direct historical line to him from Mao and Deng, the resolution will give Xi the ultimate CCP street cred he needs to guide China in the direction he wants.
In 2021, Xi is tinkering with China's past — and present — to pilot its future. He's cast himself as the natural heir to heavyweights Mao and Deng, without breaking with either to take something from both.
The saying goes that Mao made China stand up (a phrase he's famous for yet never actually uttered), and Deng made China get rich. The next step is for Xi to build on their legacies to make China "strong" — a superpower in its own right.
Wait, why does Xi even need to do this if he's already super powerful? After all, he's crushed all dissent within the party, gone after tech titans who were getting too rich, lifted presidential term limits, and now has Chinese kids studying how Xi "thinks."
In the near term, though, Xi cannot afford even a quibble as he embarks on his big plans to transform China. If no one questioned Mao or Deng when they were at the peak of their power, Xi must ensure no one will dare challenge him if he says, for example, that the Chinese economy must grow a bit less in order to become a more equal society. Or when the party decides next year whether Xi can "run" for an unprecedented third term in office.
What's more, Xi knows that as a "transformative" leader he won't even need a formal title to still be the big boss after he eventually steps down. (Fun fact: in the 1990s Deng wielded more influence behind the scenes as the head of China's bridge association than Jiang Zemin as president.)
Still, we've learned from recent Chinese history that rewriting it can have unintended consequences. Each time the party has reviewed its past, it also set in motion other stuff that almost broke its grip on power: Mao's Great Leap Forward caused the worst famine in history, and Deng's economic reforms led to a pro-democracy movement that shook the CCP to its core until it was brutally suppressed on the streets of Tiananmen in 1989.
Whatever China's all-powerful leader has in mind for the immediate future, many things could go south. A miscalculation on Taiwan, a financial crash if the real estate sector collapses, or failing on his zero-COVID strategy could all backfire — and Xi will be on the hook.