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French left-wing coalition tops election results
The New Popular Front won 182 seats in France’s National Assembly and became the largest party in a shock result from Sunday’s second-round vote, but no party has the numbers to form a governing majority.
Voter turnout was at its highest level in a generation – with the electorate likely spurred on by the far-right National Rally party, aka RN, coming in first last weekend. On Sunday, the RN fell far short of expectations, placing third with 143 seats. But fear of Marine Le Pen’s party did not drive support for Emmanuel Macron’s centrists, as it did in 2022 and 2017 — voters found a way to deny her a government while punishing the deeply unpopular president at the same time. Macron’s party lost seats despite coming in second at 163 seats, and Prime Minister Gabriel Attal offered his resignation.
What happens now? The NFP itself is a deeply unstable alliance of necessity, with bitter rivalries between the leaders of its constituent parties. It’s hard to imagine them staying together, but Macron is likely to try to form a “Rainbow Coalition” of centrists and leftists to govern with full powers. He’ll have to make major policy compromises to keep it together.
Failing that, Macron can implement a caretaker government with more limited authority until he can call another snap election in 12 months.
“France now faces a period of deep, political confusion which could be exploited by Le Pen,” says Eurasia Group’s Mujtaba Rahman. “The other squabbling, political forces of left, right, and center will struggle to agree on anything in the months ahead to soften the French electorate’s anger or anxieties about immigration, the cost of living, public services, or the exploding budget deficit.”Can Le Pen rewrite French politics next week?
Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally party, aka RN, topped the first round of voting on Sunday, winning about a third of the French vote – the best showing in the party’s half-century history. But in next Sunday’s round two, will she be able to win a majority?
Non: Macron’s Ensemble party, which placed third with about 20%, is hobbled, but the left and center right are also closing ranks against Le Pen. In hundreds of races, they’re withdrawing third-place candidates to consolidate direct challenges to RN. Respected pollsters predict about 270 seats for Le Pen, 19 shy of a majority.
That would mean a chaotic, hung parliament and a caretaker government overseen by a technocrat. President Emmanuel Macron would be a lame duck for the last three years of his presidency. Count France out of any major EU initiatives during that time.
Oui: If collapsing most races into two-way contests alienates voters and suppresses turnout, the RN benefits from greater motivation among its base. And of course, pollsters have historically had trouble accurately predicting RN’s appeal.
The loser: In calling these snap elections after Le Pen surged in European Parliament elections, Macron gambled that, as in the past, the French people would have little appetite for far-right rule at home. No matter what happens next Sunday he – and the liberal centrist movement he has built – have lost that bet.
Macron’s election gambit looks doomed to fail
France faces a nail-biter snap election this Sunday. Barring one of the biggest polling errors in French history, President Emmanuel Macron is set to lose his parliamentary majority.
Where are the polls? The far-right National Rally, aka RN, party led by Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella is ahead with 35-38% of the vote, far exceeding Macron’s party, which is polling around 20% and falling. But an unlikely alliance of leftist parties calling itself the New Popular Front, or NFP, is garnering 28-31% of the vote, and given France’s unpredictable two-round voting system, the final result is anyone’s guess.
The worst-case scenario for Macron: Voters who fear the far right flock to the NFP, while those who fear the left go to RN in a mutual attempt to block the other’s chances of forming a government — squeezing Macron’s centrists out.
There’s a chance RN can pull off a slim majority, which would make Bardella Macron’s new prime minister – hardly a recipe for productive governance. Bardella says he won’t form a minority government and risk a rapid ejection by a coalition of centrists and left-wingers.
The left, meanwhile, is less likely to get a majority, and even if they did, they can’t agree on who would get to be PM.
What about a deadlock? This might be Macron’s best bet. He could then attempt to form a national unity government with a technocratic moderate as PM. Failing that, he could keep the current government with reduced powers in a caretaker capacity for one year before holding new elections — but that’s an unpopular option, and Macron is already deeply unpopular.
Macron’s decision to call snap elections may be one he lives to regret. France will struggle with gridlock and partisanship in virtually all these potential outcomes, which will be detrimental to France – and to Macron’s domestic and geopolitical ambitions.
“It would be ironic,” Ian Bremmerwrote yesterday, “if the man most devoted to building a strong France, Europe, and Ukraine ended up being responsible for weakening all three.”Viewpoint: Expect more drubbings for incumbents in France and the UK
Upcoming elections in France and the UK appear likely to deliver historic defeats for both countries’ ruling parties in a challenging electoral cycle for incumbents around the world. The polling shows the centrist alliance led by French President Emmanuel Macron’s Rennaissance party trailing both the far-right National Rally and the left-wing New Popular Front ahead of the legislative elections on June 30 and July 7 – pointing to an extremely difficult government formation process.
Meanwhile, the UK’s ruling Conservative party's dire polling ahead of the July 4 elections has prompted speculation of an “extinction event” that renders it virtually irrelevant in the next parliament. These votes follow others in countries including South Africa and India where the incumbents performed worse than expected.
What’s going on here? Eurasia Group expert Lindsay Newman says it’s a “long-COVID story” of the pandemic’s economic aftershocks fueling a political backlash. We asked her to explain.
This year is shaping up to be a bad one for incumbents. What are the lessons from elections so far?
In a series of surprise electoral outcomes, the ruling parties in South Africa and India both lost their parliamentary majorities, while the government-backed candidate lost Senegal’s presidential election to a little-known opposition figure. The driving narrative in all three is the long-COVID story – more specifically, historically high inflation levels.
Mexico, where ruling party candidate Claudia Sheinbaum easily won the presidential election, is one country that bucked the trend. Sheinbaum benefited as the hand-picked successor of the popular President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who has advanced an agenda focused on addressing economic headwinds through job creation and wage increases.
Can you explain the long Covid effect a little more?
Following the economic dislocations of the pandemic, inflation has been elevated and persistent around the world. We have higher-for-longer cost of living pressures and unemployment rates – factors that are shaping how voters think and particularly what they think about their governments. Pocketbook issues always tend to be salient during elections, and many peoples’ pocketbooks seem especially light in the aftermath of the pandemic.
So, do you think this trend will continue this year — for example, in the outcomes of the elections in France, the UK, and the US?
That’s what the polling is telling us. The electoral reckoning with post-pandemic conditions, including the inflation shock, is a global story. The outcomes thus far in 2024 suggest this will remain a difficult cycle for incumbents. We have to expect more of the same in these upcoming elections.
Interestingly, the political backlash seems to be coming even in relatively healthy economic environments, right?
There is nuance to what we are seeing. Voters are responding to how they feel about the economic environment they find themselves in, rather than the statistics or the nuts and bolts of the economic outlook. In the case of the US, for example, the country’s economic recovery has been one of the bright spots of the post-pandemic period, yet it’s not perceived that way domestically, and surveys show that inflation, the economy, and immigration are key concerns for voters going into the fall.
There was a similar dynamic at play in India, which has one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, yet the felt experience of unemployment, rising prices, and inequities is likely behind the election results.
How worried are you about the potential for this backlash to destabilize political systems around the world? Where do we go from here?
Given the disruption and disorder we have seen over the last five to ten years, we have to expect more rather than less uncertainty ahead. This year’s voter backlash ties into another trendline I have been watching: a rising new radicalization of attitudes as well as actions. It has its roots in tectonic shifts in well-established public opinion, such as the 18.5-point average decline in support for Israel across dozens of countries registered by a January poll. Another driver is a broad political realignment away from the center and toward the poles.
The political consequences of these shifts are seen in the US in President Joe Biden’s outreach to younger and more progressive voting blocs and in Donald Trump’s appeals to his base. In Europe, nearly one-third of voters now opt for antiestablishment parties, either on the far right or far left, while in Latin America, antiestablishment candidates have secured a wave of victories in the post-pandemic period. We will get through the 2024 election cycle, but the risky times are likely to persist as these dynamics continue to ripple through the global system.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Viewpoint: Far right poised for gains in EU elections
Nearly 400 million people across the 27 countries of the EU will be eligible to vote from June 6-9 for members of the European Parliament. These representatives will serve a five-year term and be charged with passing and amending EU legislation. But their first order of business will be to elect the president of the European Commission, the EU’s executive body. They will vote on a candidate proposed by the European Council, which comprises the EU heads of state or government, based on the parliamentary election results.
Amid intensifying economic concerns and longstanding fears of migration, far-right parties are expected to expand their parliamentary representation. We asked Eurasia Group experts Anna-Carina Hamker and Mujtaba Rahman why that is and what this strong showing could mean for EU policy and politics over the next five years.
What issues are shaping voter preferences?
Unsurprisingly, there is some variation across member states. According to recent Eurobarometer polling, security concerns are greater in eastern European countries that are closer to the war in Ukraine, whereas climate change and the economy top the list of concerns elsewhere. But broadly speaking, the economic situation, public health, the fight against poverty and social exclusion, and defense and security are key issues in most European countries.
Far-right parties appear poised for strong gains – why is that?
Amid sluggish economic growth and high inflation, policies to mitigate climate change and favor agricultural imports from Ukraine have prompted a public backlash to which established conservative and socialist parties have been slow to respond. The discontent spilled out into the streets earlier this year in a series of protests by farmers and truckers. Sensing an opening, far-right parties threw their support behind the protests and have seen their popularity soar.
A more structural factor of support for these parties is concern over migration, which really started to gain traction with the large flows of refugees fleeing the war in Syria in 2014. European countries have long histories of receiving migration but lack steering mechanisms such as functioning integration policies. Center-left and center-right parties have ignored the issue for decades, resulting in high levels of integration failure in European societies.
How big do you expect these gains to be, and what will be their impact on EU policy?
Far-right parties will likely expand their representation from less than 20% of seats to about 25%. Overall, that will not materially affect policymaking on key issues such as Ukraine, competitiveness, and enlargement over the next five years, which was already going to be difficult. But it will have an impact on the EU’s environmental agenda and its stance on migration. Far-right parties have already helped drive an overhaul of the bloc’s migration framework and dilute some aspects of the green agenda.
The next commission will have to tackle the next big phase of the green transition, which will involve more politically costly measures for households and firms to achieve net zero by 2050. Ad-hoc cooperation between centrist and right-wing groups on these issues will likely delay or dilute some of these measures. Nonetheless, it is unlikely to derail the EU's climate ambitions overall, as all the major party groups and the vast majority of national governments remain committed to meeting both the 2030 and 2050 goals.
What will be the consequences of these gains for domestic politics in prominent member states?
A strong result for the far right would likely have the biggest impact in France, where polling suggests that Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party will outperform President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance Party. That would increase the odds of a successful censure motion against the government in parliament that would trigger early parliamentary elections. If Le Pen’s formation were to win half the seats in those elections (which is unlikely), that would force Macron to appoint her or someone else from her party as prime minister.
Meanwhile, a strong showing for Alternative for Germany would further fuel the debate about migration and give the party a boost ahead of important elections in three eastern German states in September and general elections next year. Similarly, a strong showing for Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers party would reinforce its standing within the ruling coalition. Moreover, there is speculation that Meloni could offer her support for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s bid for another term in exchange for a weighty portfolio in the next commission and policy concessions that would help Meloni’s domestic agenda.
What are the biggest policy challenges EU institutions will face in their next mandate?
Providing diplomatic, military, and financial support for Ukraine will remain a top priority for the EU, especially considering expectations of a weaker US commitment. A potential return to the White House by Donald Trump would create new difficulties for EU institutions, particularly on trade, as Trump would likely increase tariffs on European goods. Trade relations with China will also deteriorate as Brussels rolls out tariffs on electric vehicles and considers additional steps—and Beijing prepares retaliatory measures. Beyond these immediate challenges, Brussels faces the difficult task of doing more for its security by enacting more robust defense policies. Enlargement will be another important issue. Finding ways to shoulder the financial burden of welcoming new countries and tackling potential trade distortions that would affect some member states more than others will be among the priorities.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Euro Parliament group expels AfD
Even the far right has its limits. The European Parliament’s “Identity and Democracy” group of populist right-wing parties – including the Alternative for Germany, France’s National Rally, and Italy’s League, among others – expelled all nine AfD members on Thursday.
The move comes just weeks ahead of European Parliament elections on June 9 in which the far right is expected to make serious gains. It also comes a day after Maximilian Krah, head of AfD, said he’d step down over two scandals – one involving a senior staffer being charged with spying for China, and another stemming from Krah telling an Italian newspaper that not all members of the Nazi SS were war criminals. But sacrificing Krah wasn’t enough – and National Rally leader Marine Le Pensaid her party needed a “clean break” from AfD.
The expulsion was a bold move, given the AfD’s popularity. As recently as January, it was Germany’s second most popular party, polling at 22%, though it has since dropped six percentage points to tie for second place with the Social Democrat Party.
Polls have predicted the Identity and Democracy group’s number of seats in the European Parliament could rise from 59 to about 84 (some predicted a high of 93 before AfD’s recent scandals). National Rally, meanwhile, is surging in the polls.
What does this mean? Apart from hurting its reputation, expulsion means AfD loses access to the group’s shared resources, collective voice in parliament, and possibly some funding. But it doesn’t mean AfD members can’t run. In fact, party leaders said Thursday that they remained optimistic about the election. “We are confident we will continue to have reliable partners at our side in the new legislative period,” they said.