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Ukraine's Kursk invasion complicates Putin's war efforts
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Tabiano Castello in Italy.
How will the Ukraine Kursk incursion affect Putin's way of handling his war?
No question. It does complicate things for him quite considerably. First, they were trying to say, "Well, this is a quick thing. This will be over. The mighty Russian army is going to throw out the evil Ukrainians within a short period of time." That has clearly not been successful. So, now they're trying to say, "Well, this is not a big thing." They're trying to play it down. But whatever. It does complicate significantly the narrative that Putin has been trying to hand out, some say, or get anchored with the Russians that victory is going to come. It's only question of patience. He will have quite considerable difficulty. More on the political way. In the political respect than in the military with this operation.
What do we expect of Indian Prime Minister Modi's visit to Kyiv in the coming days?
I think it's going to be interesting to see. I would be interesting to see whether he hugs, embraces Zelensky in the way he did in a way that was quite remarkable with Putin when he was in Moscow a couple of weeks ago. And I think that sort of hugging of Putin did create some image problem for India in part of the word, notably in the West. And it will be interesting to see how far he goes in his visit to Kyiv in sort of counterbalancing the impression created by that hugging of Putin in the Kremlin.
Russia gears up to escalate against Ukraine, 6 months into invasion
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody, Ian Bremmer here. A little bit rainy on a Monday. I want to kick you off. Talk about the world and we're going back to Russia/Ukraine. Not just because it's in the headlines again, but also because the potential for significant escalation further escalation is unfortunately increasingly real.
Over the last week, week and a half, we've seen some Ukrainian military attacks on Russian bases in Crimea. That does reflect more capability than the Ukrainian military had shown here to fore, and is leading people around the Kremlin to call for more substantial strikes against military and civilian populations in Ukraine. But more significant than that, over the weekend, the car bomb assassination, targeted assassination of Darya Dugina, who is the daughter of Alexander Dugin. He clearly was the intended target of the strike. He's an ultranationalist, his writings and ravings have been cited frequently by Putin and by other members of the Russian regime.
He's little bit like a more extreme version for Russia of Steve Bannon in the United States, in the Trump administration, except Bannon was briefly had a formal role in the administration. Dugin certainly does not have that, but when I say more extreme, he literally is a poster child for the most vitriolic and violent extremist Russian nationalism. He has literally called for a genocide against Ukrainians. And that was before this assassination. He's now of course, saying that there needs to be retaliation, needs to be revenge against Ukraine. They need to be wiped off the map
And it's the fact that the Kremlin and Russian State Media are talking about this as proven to be from the Ukrainians. There's a lot of talk about being ordered by the Ukrainian government. It's pretty clear they don't have any direct proof of that at this point. And it's frankly hard to imagine that the Ukrainian government would make a direct order of this kind of an act in part because they benefit so much from being wrongfully invaded by the Russians, and not being a terrorist state, not engaging in clear war crimes. And this guy's a civilian. This would be a very clear transgression of that narrative.
Now, certainly that doesn't mean the Ukrainians aren't responsible for it in a war time, especially when they're taking massive economic and human losses. You're going to have partisans. You're going to have radicals. You're going to have all sorts of activities that are not necessarily directly coordinated by, or with the Ukrainian government. I, for example, have been surprised that there haven't been actions taken by Ukrainian radicals to blow up some of the pipelines that transit Russian gas through Ukraine, to Europe. So far so good. And it's not that like the Russian government has the ability to really ensure security of those pipelines so far. So I've been surprised about this.
But here we have an attack, a targeted attack, a targeted assassination just outside of Moscow. And the Russian government is making a very big deal out of it. They are. At the same time, we've seen some headlines about Russian soldiers that the Russian government allege have had severe chemical burns and disfigurement after fighting in Ukraine, claiming that the Ukrainian government is using some of these munitions. Again, absolutely no proof of that. No evidence of that from the United Nations, from the International Community and the rest from NATO. But that kind of thing implies that the Russians are gearing up to legitimize in the eyes of their own population, at that the very least, some form of further escalation against Ukraine. There is on August 24th, this is not only the six month anniversary of the Russian invasion that started on February 24th, but also is Ukrainian Independence Day.
So, we know that Putin personally finds a lot of importance in certain dates that have significance for him, and will make major military and political decisions on the basis of that. That certainly implies that this week is going to be a particularly ugly one. Most of the fighting between Russian/Ukraine over the course of the past couple of months has been limited to the Donbas and the environs of Kherson, north of Crimea, with some exceptions and some targeting of civilian areas, including in Odessa and including around Kiev, but relatively little. That of course could change. There's also always the possibility of Russians using weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, most likely that would lead to unspeakable horrors for the Ukrainian population that wouldn't be able to defend against it. They would certainly flee any cities where they were used.
Something we have to continue to be concerned about in the worst possible case, tactical nuclear weapons. I have a very hard time imagining that on the ground, unless the Russians were facing devastation of their own forces inside Ukraine. That certainly is not the case right now, but the fact that we're even talking about it, or have to talk about it as a possibility. Shows just how incredibly volatile and dangerous this all has become.
And then one other point is the fact that the Russians are claiming that the people, the woman that perpetrated this attack on Dugin and his daughter, as it turned out, has fled Russia, and is now in Estonia, which no friend of Russia. One of the hardest line in supporting Ukraine and in expressing anger and efforts to completely punish and sever the Russian economy and the Russian people from the rest of the world. A NATO member, the fact that the Russians would be calling to take action on the ground against this suspected, or claimed to be suspected assassin in a NATO country, is also something that raises the possibility of further escalation. So far in the war between Russia and Ukraine, there's been an enormous amount of military support for the Ukrainians, enormous amount of economic punishment of the Russians, but there hasn't been any real direct fighting between NATO and Russia.
You haven't seen the major cyberattacks for example, that the Russians clearly have the capacity for, but they haven't engaged in them so far, whether that will hold true in the coming days and weeks would be one of the most important trip wires that could expand the Ukraine war into something much more dangerous.
So, those are some of the things we're thinking about right now. Watch what is coming out of the Kremlin. Not that anyone should believe any piece of misinformation, disinformation that comes from Russian State Media. But clearly the fact that they don't report objectively does make it a very interesting set of statements to watch because it implies, these are the messages directly that the Kremlin intends to send to their own population and internationally. So in that regard, I think that RT and Sputnik and other organizations like this do require a fair amount of scrutiny, if you want to know what's going on inside the Kremlin at this point.
So that's it for me. I hope everyone's doing well, and let's hope that this doesn't come to pass for and on the ground of Ukraine this week. Talk soon.
For more of Ian Bremmer's weekly analyses, subscribe to his GZERO World newsletter at ianbremmer.bulletin.comFault lines are emerging in the Western front against Russia
French President Emmanuel Macron made headlines over the weekend when he called for the West not to "humiliate" Russia in its war against Ukraine "so that the day when the fighting stops we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means."
The statement drew ire from the Ukrainian government. Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba bristled at the suggestion, saying such calls “only humiliate France” because Russia “humiliates itself”
President Volodymyr Zelensky, for his part, seemed perplexed by the thought that he should be wary not to humiliate Russia when "for eight years they have been killing us."
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I share his sentiment. It is immoral to ask Ukrainians to show restraint or moderate their war aims in order to help Russian President Vladimir Putin "save face." He started this war unprovoked. The only alternative to humiliating Russia is to let it win—no doubt an unacceptable outcome for Ukraine, and one only Ukrainians have the right to accept, anyway.
Statements like Macron’s undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and weaken the Western front against Russia. They signal to Putin that time is on his side: that if only he can take and hold all the Donbas and keep the land bridge to Crimea, he can outlast the West. Pressuring Kyiv to accept a ceasefire before it has retaken all of its lost territory would de facto codify Russia’s gains—precisely what Putin wants. As such, these calls make it more, not less, likely that Putin stays the course in his war of conquest against Ukraine.
That doesn’t mean Russia has a path to victory. As I’ve written before, no matter what happens on the battlefield, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine will turn out to be a catastrophic strategic mistake. Zelensky is an international hero, and Ukraine is now decidedly anti-Russian. The transatlantic alliance has a newfound sense of purpose. Europe is increasing its military spend. NATO is expanding both its membership and its activities along Russia’s borders. American and European sanctions are effectively permanent, and they will cause significant long-term damage to the Russian economy. There’s no conceivable scenario in which Russia comes out of this war economically and geopolitically stronger than before February 24.
But when it comes to the narrow fight for the Donbas—Putin’s stated goal for the "second phase" of the "special military operation"—calls to negotiate with Russia even as it continues to mercilessly shell Ukrainian cities make it easier for Putin to claim a win there.
As poorly conceived as it was, though, Macron’s statement was no slip of the tongue. The French president has repeatedly insisted that Russian President Vladimir Putin should be incentivized to end the war as soon as possible, even if it means pressuring the Ukrainians to voluntarily cede part of their territory to Russia.
And he’s not alone in calling for Putin to be appeased. Whether in private or in public, the leaders of Germany and Italy have also urged Ukraine to make some sort of compromise with Russia in recent weeks, as have former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger and the New York Times editorial board.
What’s happening is that as the conflict settles into aprotracted yet unstable stalemate, the triumphalist mood that permeated European capitals until recently has turned gloomy. Russia is making slow but steady territorial gains in the Donbas, and despite their valiant efforts, Ukrainian forces are displaying wear and tear. It’s becoming clear that neither side will be able to achieve a decisive victory anytime soon.
In the meantime, however, global growth, inflation, energy prices, and food shortages are getting worse. The prospect of an unending “war of attrition,” as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called it, has some leaders starting to wonder aloud about the impact of a long slog on their own economies and politics.
In their eyes, those like Macron who believe that Ukrainians can’t win, that Russians will eventually be able to capture and hold most of the Donbas, that sanctions will hurt the West more than they hurt Russia—they are trying to get ahead of the inevitable outcome. Whether the Ukrainians agree or not, they think it’s better for everyone to freeze the conflict sooner rather than later, preventing unnecessary Ukrainian bloodshed, global economic pain, and political upheaval.
There are, of course, exceptions to this position: the Americans, the British, the Finns, the Swedes, the Poles, and the Baltics are still committed to helping Ukraine recapture their territory, believing only Ukrainians can determine when enough is enough. Kyiv’s official position is that Ukraine will keep fighting until the country’s full territorial integrity has been restored—or at the very least, until Russian forces are pushed out of the territory they have occupied since February 24.
So far the Biden administration has managed to keep the coalition together in support of Ukraine’s war aims, but its ability to continue to do so over the coming three to six months will be increasingly tested.
After more than 100 days of near-absolute unity, cracks in the Western front are starting to show.
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The tide is turning in Russia’s war against Ukraine
For the past 100 days, the narrative in the West on the Russia-Ukraine war has been remarkably consistent. Against all odds, vastly outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainians have time and again humiliated the Russian forces, supported by a relentlessly united Western front doing more and more each day to help Ukraine win the war.
As the conflict goes on, however, that will no longer be the dominant story. Increasingly, the narrative will be punctured by more frequent Russian military wins and Ukrainian losses, with cracks emerging in Ukraine’s information war and with American and European support for Ukraine getting close to peaking.
This narrative shift won’t happen immediately or suddenly. There’s still momentum behind Ukraine’s counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, Kyiv is still winning the information war (though not in the developing world), and much of the West is still committed to helping it defeat Russia.
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But we’re already seeing the military tide turn a bit, with Russian forces slowly but steadily gaining territory in the Donbas, taking about a kilometer of land every day. On Tuesday, they seized most of Severodonetsk and made headway toward Lysychansk, two of the last remaining Ukrainian strongholds in the Luhansk region. They are also gaining territory in Donetsk, threatening the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. So in addition to having won the battle for Mariupol and secured a land bridge to Crimea, Russia is now getting close to capturing much of the Donbas—its stated aim for the “second phase” of the war.
View of Severodonetsk from damaged building in the outskirts of the frontline city.Rick Mave/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
As Russians continue to make gains in the Donbas, the Ukrainians will find it harder to win the information war as overwhelmingly as they have thus far. We’re going to see more negative stories like the one published in the Washington Post on May 29, the first since the war started to shine a light on Ukraine’s military losses and attrition problems.
Moreover, as neither side is able to eke out a decisive victory and war fatigue sets in, the limits of the West’s support for Ukraine will start to show.
The latest move from Europe came late Monday, when European Union leaders agreed on a sixth round of sanctions effectively banning most Russian oil imports. In a compromise reached after weeks of wrangling with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán—Russian President Vladimir Putin’s best friend in Europe—the embargo blocks oil delivered by sea but temporarily (albeit indefinitely) exempts imports via pipeline, which make up one-third of all imports. Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, which are highly dependent on piped Russian oil, will be excluded from the ban.
Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yuri Kadobnov/AFP via Getty Images
The partial embargo, which is expected to be finalized this week, comprises two-thirds of all the oil Europe gets from Russia. Add to that Germany and Poland’s pledge to voluntarily wind down their piped oil imports by the end of 2022, and 90% of Russian crude exports to Europe will be effectively cut off. That’s a big deal for a nation that has been described as “a gas station masquerading as a country,” depriving the Russian war machine of billions of dollars every year.
Some of that revenue they’ll make up on the back of higher oil prices, with Brent crude rising to over $120 per barrel following the embargo announcement. And some of that oil they’ll be able to sell at a discount to other countries around the world, especially China and India. But some of it they won’t be able to offload at all, because the EU and the United Kingdom are also set to prohibit European underwriters from insuring Russian oil shipments to third countries. Given that most of the world’s oil trade is insured by European companies, the measure will make it hard for Russia to redirect oil to Asia and other non-aligned markets.
As they reach the top rungs of the sanctions ladder, though, European leaders will find it increasingly hard to keep their steady escalation going to include a ban on piped oil imports, a gas embargo, and secondary sanctions—especially after having agreed to water down the oil ban at the behest of Orbán. These measures would inflict considerable economic pain on their citizens and risk political backlash, therefore requiring more resolve than European leaders have displayed so far.
Meanwhile, the Americans continue to send billions of dollars’ worth of aid and advanced weaponry to Ukraine, but the Ukrainians want more, most recently pleading for long-range advanced multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) they say they desperately need in order to counter Russia’s long-range firepower and challenge its artillery dominance in the Donbas. The White House wants to do everything it can to help Ukraine win, but not at the expense of risking a direct confrontation with Russia. While President Biden confirmed the US will supply medium-range rockets, he ruled out sending long-range rocket systems “that can strike into Russia” and expand the war.
Western leaders won’t tolerate unlimited pain and risk to support Ukraine. The longer the war continues and Russia hangs on, the more likely it is those limits will be exposed—especially as the U.S. gets closer to midterm elections and winter threatens European homes with soaring energy costs.
Debates will shift from how to best help Ukraine win to whether Ukraine can actually win and what their endgame should be. The allies will become increasingly split over whether to keep ramping up their support of Ukraine’s quest for total victory, and calls to end the conflict and normalize relations with Russia will become more common. Wavering Western backing will in turn further embolden Russia and hurt Ukraine’s chances.
To be clear, the Ukrainian government is still standing—that’s not about to change, and it’s a reality that flies in the face of Putin’s war goals. But the Russian military is unlikely to melt away anytime soon, and increasing Western support is contingent on what happens on the battlefield and at home. That makes a drawn-out (and not particularly stable) stalemate all the more likely.
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